site.btaRussia’s War in Ukraine Poses Dilemma for Vucic

When, in an address to the nation on February 25, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said there were difficult days ahead for both the people of Serbia and the citizens of Europe, as national RTS reported, he revealed his country’s complicated and unenviable position in foreign affairs.

Even on the next day, this became obvious when European Parliament Rapporteur for Serbia, Vlado Bilcik, tweeted that that Serbia’s choice not to join the European Union sanctions is a defining foreign policy decision for much broader relations between the EU and Serbia, Tanjug reported.

Faced with the crisis in Ukraine, Vucic has to take a clear stance on matters to which he cannot – or is reluctant – to respond. Trying to sit in two chairs at once, he says Serbia is committed to peace, abides by international law and considers the violation of territorial integrity of any country, i.e. Ukraine included, wrong, but will not introduce any sanctions against Russia, for on this matter it will be guided by defending its own interests.

Serbian interests and Belgrade’s closer ties with Moscow date from the war Yugoslav Wars under Slobodan Milosevic. And it is probably time for Brussels to remember that Vucic was minister of information in the Milosevic cabinet. The connection between Russia-Serbia relations today and the Milosevic times can also be discerned by the fact that just days ago Momcilo Babic, a close Milosevic family friend during the last years of Yugoslavia, was appointed Serbian ambassador in Moscow.
With the war in Ukraine, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Vucic to conceal the fact that he is not aligned with Europe in his relations with Russia. Or that it is almost impossible to warmly embrace Brussels and Moscow at the same time.

It also demonstrated the contradiction between the Balkan country and the EU, the United States and other powers, as Serbia refuses to impose sanctions on Moscow.

For years, the Serbian President has been trying to maintain comfortable relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, while also developing ties with the EU to which his country wants to accede, and the West in a broader sense.

In response to the war, Vucic tried to achieve a new balance. He declared “support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine” and his government supported the UN resolution which condemned Russia’s aggression. But he rejected the calls to follow the EU line in respect to sanctions. This is definitely a recognition by Belgrade of the fact that Russia refused to impose such measures on Serbia during the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s.

Vucic, who will run for re-election next month, says he wants to become part of the western family, which seems an increasingly difficult task, largely because of his policy. Serbia is quite dependent on Russian energy sources. Besides, Moscow enjoys strong support among a large portion of the public, fed by incessant pro-Putin propaganda that media loyal to Vucic have been spreading for years.

This support was demonstrated last Friday when thousands, some waving Russian flags and carrying Putin photos, passed through downtown Belgrade to show their support for Moscow. The rally was in sharp contrast with the mass protests against Russia’s war in Ukraine across the rest of Europe. 

Belgrade is also not in line with the EU as far as the economy is concerned. While the bloc severs relations with Moscow and closes its skies for flights from Russia, Air Serbia increases its flight services to Moscow.

Serbia has had close relations with Russia since Yugoslavia’s disintegration in the 1990s, when Russia opposed NATO’s 1999 bombing undertaken because of Belgrade’s repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

To explain his invasion of Ukraine, Putin cited NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, which was not approved by the UN Security Council, as an example of unilateral military action against a country that had not engaged in a direct conflict with the Alliance.
Moscow is also a powerful and loud ally of Belgrade that rejected Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 and blocked its accession to international organisations.

Putin has visited Serbia several times and was welcomed warmly as the country’s friend by both the political leadership and a large part of the populace.

Last November, Vucic visited Putin and in Sochi the two presidents concluded an “incredible” natural gas deal, as a result of which prices remained unchanged but quantities increased, while the rest of the Balkan region faces a power crisis.
“Putin’s and Russia’s popularity among the Serbian public has reached surrealistic levels,” says Vuk Vuksanovic, senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

A 2021 study shows that Russia is far ahead of the others when Serbs are asked on which power they should rely most for their national security. The same poll, conducted by the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, showed that two-thirds of Serbs have a very positive opinion of Putin.

Against this background, any radical difference with Moscow could cause shocks right at the time when parliamentary and presidential elections will be held on April 3.

“Suffice it for the Russian ambassador to come out with a statement accusing the Serbian government that it has betrayed Serbian-Russian friendship in favour of those who bombed Serbia and took away Kosovo, and unbelievable political chaos will break loose,” Vuksanovic forecast.

Serbia’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia also raises awkward questions for the EU.

Brussels states clearly that membership candidates should follow the EU's foreign policy. The European Parliament Resolution condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine criticized Serbia in relation to the sanctions.

The resolution, passed with an overwhelming majority last week, “strongly regrets Serbia’s non-alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, which damages its EU accession process.”

It remains to be seen what the predictable outcome of the presidential vote in Serbia next month will be. And realistically forecast that there will be no change in Belgrade’s policy towards Moscow. At least not now. Vucic seems to be probably opting for a modified form of Titovism: a country not associated with military blocs, served by both East and West, and doing lucrative business with all. It's only that Tito died. Quite some time ago.